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ABSTRACT	
Background	and	Purpose:	Terrorism	is	a	real	and	present	danger.	The	build-up	to	an	attack	
includes	planning,	travel,	and	reconnaissance	which	necessarily	require	the	offender	to	
move	through	their	environment.		Whilst	research	has	examined	patterns	of	terrorist	attack	
locations,	with	a	few	exceptions	(e.g.	Rossmo	&	Harries,	2011),	it	has	not	examined	the	
spatial	behavior	of	the	terrorists	themselves.	In	this	paper,	we	investigate	whether	the	
spatial	mobility	patterns	of	terrorists	resemble	those	of	criminals	(and	the	wider	population)	
and	if	these	change	in	the	run	up	to	their	attacks.		
Method:	Using	mobile	phone	data	records	for	the	ringleaders	of	four	different	UK-based	
terrorist	plots	in	the	months	leading	up	to	their	attacks,	we	examine	the	frequency	with	
which	terrorists	visit	different	locations,	how	far	they	travel	from	key	anchor	points	such	as	
their	home,	the	distance	between	sequential	cell-site	hits	and	how	their	range	of	movement	
varies	as	the	planned	time	to	attack	approaches.	
Conclusions:	Like	the	wider	population	(and	criminals),	the	sample	of	terrorists	examined	
exhibited	predictable	patterns	of	spatial	behavior.		Most	movements	were	close	to	their	
home	location	or	safe	house,	and	they	visited	a	relatively	small	number	of	locations	most	of	
the	time.	Disaggregating	these	patterns	over	time	provided	mixed	evidence	regarding	the	
way	in	which	their	spatial	activity	changed	as	the	time	to	the	planned	attack	approached.		
The	findings	are	interpreted	in	terms	of	how	they	inform	criminological	understanding	of	
the	spatial	behavior	of	terrorists,	and	the	implications	for	law	enforcement.	
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1. INTRODUCTION	
Terrorism	occupies	a	prominent	position	in	a	long	list	of	security	threats	–	from	climate	
change	to	global	pandemics	to	energy	shortages	–	that	the	world	confronts	in	the	twenty-
first	century.		In	recent	years,	it	has	been	Islamist	extremism	which	has	represented	the	
major	area	of	concern	to	the	West.			Various	definitions	of	terrorism	exist,	with	most	
emphasizing	a	reliance	on	violence	in	order	to	further	a	political	goal	(Crenshaw,	1992).		Yet	
a	terrorist	plot	is	more	than	just	the	violent	act	that	is	its	embodiment,	or	the	motivations	of	
the	perpetrators.	The	practical	precursor	steps	which	take	place	as	a	plot	progresses	–	
training,	meetings,	securing	a	safe	house,	procurement	of	materials	and	reconnaissance	–	
take	time	to	plan,	and	just	like	everyone	else	“terrorists	operate	within	the	constraints	and	
boundaries	of	both	time	and	space”	(Smith	et	al.,	2008,	p.43).		
Accordingly,	understanding	the	antecedent	behavior	of	terrorists	prior	to	an	
intended	attack	has	received	increasing	attention	in	recent	years.		In	the	context	of	studies	
of	environmental	criminology,	this	has	included	studying	the	steps	that	must	be	taken	for	a	
terrorist	act	to	occur	(Clarke	&	Newman,	2006).		The	aim	of	the	current	study	is	to	
contribute	to	this	literature	by	examining	terrorist	patterns	of	spatial	activity	during	the	
antecedent	phases	of	the	plots	with	which	they	were	involved.		Our	intention	is	to	
determine	whether	regularities	in	their	movement	exist	and	whether	these	resemble	those	
of	the	wider	public	or	offenders	engaged	in	urban	crime.		Whilst	such	patterns	have	been	
examined	before,	much	of	the	research	has	tended	to	be	anecdotal	in	nature	(Post,	Sprizak	
&	Denny,	2003),	largely	due	to	the	difficulties	associated	with	obtaining	the	necessary	data.		
Where	empirical	analyses	have	been	conducted	(see	below),	these	have	tended	to	be	
limited	to	examining	the	location	of	terrorists’	home	and	attack	locations.		In	contrast,	in	
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what	follows	we	present	an	analysis	of	day-by-day	patterns	of	movements	–	estimated	
using	data	from	mobile	phone	data	-	for	the	Emirs	(leaders)	involved	in	four	UK-based	
Islamist	terrorists’	plots	in	the	run	up	to	their	attacks.		All	four	plots	involved	bomb	attacks	
against	the	UK	in	the	last	fifteen	years	-	in	three	cases,	attacks	were	carried	out,	while	the	
fourth	was	disrupted	by	the	police	during	the	final	stages	of	planning.	As	discussed	below,	
we	argue	that	just	like	everyone	else,	terrorists	–	such	as	those	studied	here	-	are	subject	to	
constraints	that	limit	their	movement	potential,	which	leads	to	predictable	patterns	of	
activity.			
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	discuss	
movement	patterns	of	the	public	in	general.		This	is	followed	by	a	review	of	the	existing	
literature	on	the	mobility	patterns	of	urban	criminals	and	terrorists,	which	informs	a	set	of	
hypotheses	that	are	tested	in	subsequent	sections.		The	data	and	our	analytic	strategy	are	
then	described,	along	with	the	results	generated.		The	paper	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	
the	findings	and	their	implications	for	policing	and	criminological	understanding.	
1.1	Literature	review	
A	natural	starting	point	for	this	study	concerns	the	spatial	activity	patterns	of	the	wider	
population,	and	those	engaged	in	forms	of	criminal	behavior.		A	brief	discussion	of	the	
movement	patterns	of	such	actors	is	useful	insofar	as	it	helps	to	establish	what	might	be	
expected,	and	what	might	represent	points	of	departure	in	signatures	of	the	spatial	
behavior	of	terrorists.		Until	very	recently,	establishing	what	normal	patterns	of	movement	
are	has	proved	surprisingly	difficult	to	answer,	with	Gonzalez,	Hidalgo	&	Barabasi	(2008,	
p.779)	stating	that	“our	understanding	of	the	basic	laws	governing	human	motion	remains	
limited	owing	to	the	lack	of	tools	to	monitor	the	time-resolved	location	of	individuals”.		
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As	noted	by	Shoval	&	Isaacson	(2006),	research	into	human	spatial	behavior	has	traditionally	
relied	on	self-reported	data	collected	using	space-time	budget	diaries.		This	technique	is	
used	in	the	UK	National	Travel	Survey	conducted	by	the	Department	of	Transport	to	
examine	the	movement	patterns	of	the	public.		Analyses	of	these	data	(Department	for	
Transport,	2015)	reveal	regularities	in	spatial	behavior,	with	there	being	(for	example)	a	
clear	pattern	of	distance-decay,	whereby	shorter	trips	are	more	common	than	are	longer	
ones	(e.g.	around	65%	of	trips	are	under	7.5kms).			
More	recent	work	has	also	taken	advantage	of	data	collected	through	ubiquitous	
mobile	devices.	For	example,	using	mobile	phone	data,	Gonzalez	et	al.	(2008)	tracked	the	
movements	of	100,000	anonymous	individuals	over	a	period	of	six	months.		A	key	finding	
was	that	while	some	trips	covered	long	distances,	most	were	short.		Moreover,	people’s	
activity	patterns	were	generally	predictable,	with	most	making	regular	trips	to	the	same	
areas	over	time.		In	fact,	on	average,	those	sampled	were	to	be	found	at	their	two	most	
frequently	visited	locations	about	forty-percent	of	the	time	(and	the	four	most	visited	
locations	around	60%	of	the	time).		In	a	further	study,	using	data	from	10	million	mobile	
phone	users	collected	over	a	14-week	period,	Song	et	al.	(2010)	found	similar	results	but	
with	a	slightly	higher	degree	of	predictability,	with	those	sampled	visiting	their	top	two	
locations	about	60%	of	the	time	(and	the	four	most	visited	locations	70%	of	the	time).		In	
both	studies,	other	locations	were	visited	but	with	a	diminishing	probability.		Collectively,	
these	studies	suggest	that	people	have	routine	activity	spaces	(likely	anchored	around	their	
home	and	other	nodes	of	activity);	that	most	of	their	activity	occurs	at	these	locations	or	
nearby;	and	that	the	individual	segments	of	their	daily	trips	tend	to	be	short.		Simply	put,	
people	do	not	move	about	randomly.		
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1.2	Offender	Spatial	Behavior	
Research	concerned	with	terrorist	spatial	mobility	(discussed	further	below)	is	
relatively	limited.		In	contrast,	that	concerned	with	the	spatial	behavior	of	offenders	
engaged	in	urban	crime	(e.g.	burglary)	is	much	more	developed	and	this	will	now	be	
discussed	as	a	way	of	framing	what	follows.		In	doing	so,	following	Rossmo	and	Harries	
(2011)	we	make	the	assumption	that	an	understanding	of	the	spatial	behavior	of	offenders	
(one	form	of	law	breaking	at	odds	with	social	norms)	can	inform	understanding	of	that	for	
terrorists	(another	form	of	law	breaking	also	at	odds	with	social	norms).		Obvious	objections	
to	this	are	that	while	criminal	activity	might	be	seen	to	be	rational	in	nature,	terrorist	
activity,	which	often	involves	the	risk	of	death	in	the	pursuit	of	a	perhaps	unattainable	goal,	
seems	inherently	irrational.	Moreover,	while	urban	crime	is	often	financially	motivated,	
terrorist	activity	is	generally	ideologically-driven.		In	relation	to	the	first	point,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	many	have	argued	that	urban	criminals	do	not	always	act	rationally	(e.g.	Wright	
et	al.,	2006),	and	most	scholars	(Cornish	and	Clarke,	1986;	Bennett	and	Wright,	1984;	
Cromwell,	Olson	and	Avary,	1991)	that	do	argue	that	offender	decision	making	is	rational,	
assume	that	it	is	boundedly	so.		That	is,	that	offenders	seek	to	maximize	the	benefit	of	their	
activity	whilst	minimizing	the	effort	and	risks	involved,	but	do	so	on	the	basis	of	incomplete	
and	often	biased	information.		Moreover,	they	are	assumed	to	use	heuristic	styles	of	
thinking	(Simon,	1978)	rather	than	carefully	evaluating	the	costs	and	benefits	of	action	
alternatives.		This	is	a	far	cry	from	the	classic	economic	model	(Becker,	1968)	of	the	rational	
decision	maker	invoked	by	many.	
As	to	the	differences	in	objectives	of	urban	criminals	and	terrorists,	not	only	does	a	
Darwinist	perspective	see	no	contradiction	in	altruistically	risking	one’s	life	for	the	benefit	of	
	 7	
one’s	kin	(Dawkins,	2006),	terrorism,	being	goal-driven,	is	not	inherently	mindless	or	
irrational	(Roach,	Ekblom	&	Flynn,	2005,	p.7).		Indeed,	Ruby	(2002,	p.15)	suggests	that	
“terrorism	is	perpetrated	by	rational,	lucid	people”	and	there	seems	no	reason	why	actions	
in	pursuit	of	these	goals	shouldn’t	also	be	rational	(see	also	Cothern	et	al.,	2008;	Townsley	
et	al.,	2008).		
Considering	the	movement	patterns	of	offenders,	crime	pattern	theory	(e.g.	
Brantingham	and	Brantingham,	1993)	suggests	that	just	like	everyone	else,	offenders	have	
routine	activity	spaces	that	are	shaped	by	the	locations	of	key	activity	nodes	and	anchor	
points	(such	as	their	home)	and	the	routes	between	them.		Furthermore,	that	most	of	the	
activities	they	engage	in,	including	crime,	will	take	place	within	these	spaces,	since	
familiarity	reduces	uncertainty	as	to	the	likely	outcome	of	a	given	action	(e.g.	Beavon,	
Brantingham	and	Brantingham,	1994).	A	large	and	expanding	body	of	empirical	research	
provides	support	for	crime	pattern	theory,	demonstrating	(for	example)	that	most	crimes	
are	committed	near	to	an	offender’s	current	(e.g.	Townsley	and	Sidebottom,	2008;	Bernasco	
and	Nieuwbeerta,	2005;	Bernasco	et	al.,	2005;	Rengert	and	Wasilchick,	2000;	and	for	a	
recent	review,	see	Frith,	Johnson	and	Fry,	2017)	or	previous	home	locations	(Bernasco,	
2010),	or	near	to	other	activity	nodes	such	as	their	friends’	homes	(e.g.	Wiles	and	Costello,	
2000;	Rengert	and	Wasilchick,	2000).	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	distances	
offenders	travel	varies	both	between	offenders	and	type	of	crime.	For	example,	relative	to	
their	older	counterparts,	juvenile	offenders	are	generally	found	to	travel	shorter	distances	
to	engage	in	crime.	That	said,	changes	in	the	journey	to	crime	do	not	change	linearly	with	
age.		That	is,	the	distances	travelled	to	offend	initially	increase	with	age,	but	peak	in	the	
offender’s	early	20’s,	declining	thereafter	(Andresen,	Frank,	&	Felson,	2014;	Clarke	&	Eck,	
2003).			With	respect	to	offense	types,	Rossmo	(2000)	reports	that	crimes	which	are	violent	
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in	nature	(e.g.	manslaughter	and	assault)	tend	to	occur	closer	to	the	offender’s	home	than	
do	other	forms	of	offending,	such	as	property	crime	and	burglary.	
Like	the	space-time	budget	studies	employed	in	transport	research,	studies	such	as	
those	discussed	above	are	limited	to	the	analysis	of	data	concerned	with	a	limited	number	
of	locations.		In	this	case,	data	recorded	by	the	police	concerning	offender	home	(current	or	
previous)	and	offense	locations.		More	recently,	researchers	have	used	dedicated	wearable	
electronic	devices	to	automatically	record	time-stamped	location	data	to	examine	offender	
spatial	behavior.	For	example,	using	Global	Positioning	Satellite	(GPS)	offender	monitoring	
tags,	Rossmo	et	al.	(2012)	studied	the	movement	patterns	of	a	group	of	14	reoffending	
parolees,	convicted	for	a	variety	of	offenses	(including	sexual	offenses,	drug	dealing	and	
burglary).	Using	data	for	a	one-week	period,	which	included	days	on	which	offending	
occurred,	they	studied	the	parolee’s	movement	patterns	before	and	after	offenses	took	
place.		The	offenders	were	a	heterogeneous	group	and	hence	their	precise	mobility	patterns	
varied.		However,	just	like	the	wider	public	(see	above),	and	in	line	with	crime	pattern	
theory,	it	was	apparent	that	most	visited	only	a	small	number	of	locations	each	day	
(typically	2-7	different	sites).			
	
1.3	Terrorist	Spatial	Behavior	
During	the	antecedent	phase	of	a	terrorist	attack,	analyses	of	available	data	(Cothren	
et	al.,	2008)	suggest	that	terrorists	engage	in	and	proceed	through	a	series	of	stages	ranging	
from	recruitment,	to	planning,	to	the	acquisition	or	manufacture	of	tools	necessary	to	carry	
out	their	attack(s).		During	these	stages,	the	risk	of	detection	is	a	very	real	possibility,	and	
one	they	will	seek	to	avoid.		In	relation	to	this,	Cronin	(2009,	p.104)	argues	that	terrorism	
rarely	flourishes	without	the	active	or	passive	support	of	sections	of	society,	since	a	group	
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operating	in	a	hostile	environment	is	unlikely	to	avoid	detection	for	long.		Awareness	of	the	
environment	within	which	terrorists’	act	is	thus	important.		Indeed,	Kenney	(2010,	p.923)	
argues	that	the	7/7	(London)	bombers	“drew	on	their	local	knowledge	and	experience	to	
move	around…without	having	their	plot	exposed”	(see	also,	Sageman,	2004).		Consequently,	
one	expectation	is	that	terrorist’s	patterns	of	spatial	behavior	will	typically	reflect	those	of	
the	wider	public	(and	offenders).		In	particular,	we	expect	to	observe	a	routine	activity	space	
comprising	a	relatively	limited	set	of	nodes	of	activity,	around	which	terrorists	develop	an	
awareness	and	in	which	their	presence	will	not	seem	out	of	place	(Hypothesis	1).		
Just	like	urban	criminals,	their	home	location	is	likely	to	feature	as	an	anchor	point	in	
this	activity	space.		Also	likely	to	feature	are	safe	houses.		To	explain,	a	well-documented	
feature	of	terrorist	cell	behavior	is	the	use	of	safe	houses,	with	Nance	(2008,	p.105)	noting	
that	“virtually	every	terrorist	group	has	a	series	of	safe	houses	used	as	bomb	factories,	
supply	centers,	or	weapons	armories”.		For	example,	the	‘Al-Qaeda	training	manual’,	the	
possession	of	which	led	to	the	conviction	of	an	associate	of	the	7/7	ringleader,	directs	
operatives	to	choose	a	location	for	their	premises	which	is	adequate	for	their	mission.		
Considering	empirical	research	on	the	spatial	behavior	of	terrorists,	Cothren	et	al.	
(2008)	examined	a	sample	of	data	-	collected	through	U.S.	criminal	court	trial	files	and	open	
source	materials	-	to	explore	the	distance	travelled	by	terrorists	who	conducted	attacks	on	
U.S.	soil	(see	also	Smith	et	al.,	2008).		They	found	that	while	one-third	of	their	sample	lived	
very	far	away	(in	excess	of	800	miles),	about	one-half	lived	close	to	their	targets	(within	30	
miles).		Gill	et	al.	(2016)	examined	the	distance	travelled	by	members	of	the	Provisional	Irish	
Republican	Army	(PIRA)	from	their	home	to	attack	locations	and	found	that	most	travelled	a	
distance	of	less	than	5	miles.		In	their	study,	Rossmo	and	Harries	(2011)	analyzed	the	spatial	
behavior	of	terrorist	cells	in	Turkey	using	police	records	for	which	data	were	available	on	
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both	the	location	of	terrorist	cell	(referred	to	as	safe	houses	hereafter	to	avoid	confusion	
with	what	follows)	and	attack	sites.	The	groups	for	whom	data	were	available	engaged	in	
multiple	attacks	(resulting	in	1,292	home-attack	combinations),	and	in	some	cases	used	
multiple	safe	houses,	facilitating	the	analysis	of	both	the	distance	travelled	from	their	safe	
houses	to	the	attack	sites,	and	the	distances	between	the	latter.		For	both	types	of	analysis,	
there	was	clear	evidence	of	spatial	clustering.		In	the	case	of	the	safe	houses,	and	in	line	
with	hypothesis	1,	(on	average)	the	two	nearest	safe	houses	used	by	the	same	group	tended	
to	be	within	two	miles	of	each	other.		Furthermore,	the	distance	between	the	nearest	safe	
house	and	an	attack	site	was	around	one	mile.		Taken	together,	the	findings	of	these	studies	
suggest	that	–	not	unlike	urban	criminals	–	many	terrorists	engage	in	their	activities,	
including	the	attack	itself,	at	locations	near	to	their	routine	activity	nodes.		Consequently,	in	
the	current	study,	we	expect	that	as	well	as	spending	most	of	their	time	at	a	relatively	small	
number	of	discrete	locations,	most	of	the	spatial	activity	of	the	Emirs	examined	will	be	
observed	to	occur	near	to	these	locations	if	not	at	them	(Hypothesis	2)	and	for	the	distance	
between	sequential	movements	to	be	short	(Hypothesis	3).		
With	respect	to	the	locations	that	form	a	terrorist’s	activity	space	in	the	prelude	to	
an	attack,	both	Cothren	et	al.	(2008)	and	Rossmo	&	Harries	(2011)	discuss	the	issue	of	
whether	terrorists	select	an	intended	attack	location	first	and	then	develop	an	activity	space	
around	it,	or	whether	their	existing	activity	space	determines	where	an	attack	takes	place.	
In	the	studies	discussed	above,	scholars	have	exploited	data	such	as	the	terrorist’s	attack	
locations	and	their	home	or	safe	house	locations,	in	some	cases,	having	data	for	multiple	
safe	houses	and	attack	sites.		While	such	data	allow	for	the	testing	of	some	hypotheses	
regarding	terrorist	spatial	behavior,	they	do	not	allow	for	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	
terrorist	spatial	behavior	and	if	and	how	it	develops	over	time.		In	the	current	study,	we	
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have	access	to	data	for	a	limited	number	of	terrorists,	but	have	detailed	data	on	their	spatial	
activity	over	a	substantial	interval	of	time.		This	provides	a	more	complete	picture	of	their	
movement	activity,	and	allows	us	to	examine	if	and	how	their	spatial	behavior	changes	(for	
a	similar	analysis	in	relation	to	urban	offenders,	see	Rossmo	et	al.,	2012).		In	the	event	that	
terrorists	select	targets	first	and	then	develop	their	activity	spaces	as	part	of	their	
preparatory	behavior,	we	may	expect	their	activity	spaces	to	increase	over	time	as	the	time	
to	attack	approaches	(Hypothesis	4).	In	line	with	this,	Cotheren	et	al.	(2008)	report	that	their	
data	suggest	that	as	an	attack	date	draws	nearer,	those	involved	tend	to	home	in	on	the	
attack	location.		However,	they	do	not	provide	empirical	analyses	to	support	this	assertion.		
In	their	study	of	urban	crime,	Rossmo	et	al.	(2012)	examine	changes	to	offender	spatial	
behavior	prior	to	offending	and	do	find	some	evidence	of	this,	but	only	for	a	small	number	
of	those	studied.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	their	study	examined	a	very	different	
type	of	offending.		With	respect	to	Hypothesis	4,	we	may	also	expect	to	see	variation	in	
their	activity	patterns	over	time	not	because	of	the	location	of	the	target,	but	because	of	
changes	in	those	with	whom	the	Emir’s	might	need	to	interact.			
In	the	next	section,	we	describe	the	data	analyzed	to	test	hypotheses.		We	begin	by	
describing	the	mobile	phone	data	and	how	it	was	collected	before	providing	a	summary	of	
the	sample	of	data	analyzed.	
	
2. METHODOLOGY	
2.1	Mobile	phone	data	
One	consequence	of	mobile	telephony	technology	is	that	service	providers	record	the	
location,	in	the	form	of	the	nearest	cell	mast,	that	each	call/text	carried	by	their	network	is	
made	or	received	from	(Mobile	Operators	Association,	2006).		A	cell	mast	is	a	fixed	structure	
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housing	the	electronic	equipment	necessary	to	transmit	data	from	one	device	to	another	
(Cancer	UK,	n.d.).		This	recording	of	mobile	phone	location	data	means	that	the	movement	
of	individual	customers	can	be	tracked,	and	this	has	been	exploited	by	law	enforcement	as	
an	investigative	tool,	and	researchers	as	a	method	of	collecting	data.			
Time-resolved	locations	of	the	mobile-phones	used	by	the	Emirs	of	four	Islamic	
terrorist	plots	were	obtained	from	the	Metropolitan	police.	Mobile	phones	may,	of	course,	
be	used	by	a	number	of	people,	or	associates.		Consequently,	prior	to	analysis,	to	ensure	
that	the	movement	patterns	inferred	from	the	data	were	generated	by	only	one	individual,	
it	was	necessary	to	interrogate	the	available	data	to	isolate	only	those	phones	that	were	
used	by	just	one	individual.		Moreover,	it	is	a	recognized	tactic	(Metropolitan	Police,	n.d.)	
that	terrorists	may	use	several	phones	in	the	run	up	to	an	attack.		This	was	observed	in	the	
current	data,	and	consequently	to	provide	a	more	complete	picture	of	their	activity,	data	
from	all	mobile	phones	identified	as	being	used	by	each	subject	(but	only	that	subject)	were	
used	in	what	follows.	
The	accurate	attribution	of	which	phones	were	used	by	which	subjects	is	thus	
fundamental	to	the	accuracy	of	the	analyses	that	follow.		Of	course,	the	attribution	of	
mobile	phones	to	actors	was	also	critical	to	the	police	investigations,	the	subsequent	court	
cases	and	the	coroner’s	inquests,	for	which	the	data	analyzed	here	were	originally	collated.		
Given	the	gravity	of	such	cases	and	evidential	standards,	the	task	of	attribution	was	taken	
very	seriously.		It	was	achieved	methodically	and	using	a	combination	of	techniques,	with	all	
analyses	conducted	by	two	or	more	people.		While	we	cannot	detail	these	processes	due	to	
issues	of	sensitivity,	we	are	confident	that	the	attribution	process	was	conducted	as	
accurately	as	possible.	
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Having	identified	the	set	of	telephones	used	by	each	subject,	evidential	records	
prepared	for	use	in	public	court	were	obtained	and	analyzed.		For	the	purposes	of	the	
research,	we	extracted	the	date,	time	and	cell	mast	location	(‘cell	site’)	for	each	call	made	or	
received.	Cell	site	locations	were	geocoded	using	service	provider-generated	cell	site	
identification	codes	and	a	gazetteer,	which	provided	data	with	a	spatial	accuracy	equivalent	
to	a	full	unit	postcode,	which	in	the	UK	cover	a	small	area	of	approximately	0.14	km2.	No	
data	regarding	the	telephone	numbers	called	or	other	details	were	extracted.				
Table	1	provides	a	summary	of	the	data	available	for	each	plot.		The	details	provided	
have	been	anonymized	due	to	the	sensitivity	of	the	data	and	are	presented	to	show	the	
period	over	which	data	concerning	cell	site	activity	were	available,	the	percentage	of	hours	
for	which	call	activity	was	recorded,	and	the	number	of	cell	site	locations	at	which	call	
activity	was	logged.		It	is	evident	that	the	coverage	varies	in	each	case,	both	in	terms	of	the	
period	of	time	over	which	data	were	available	and	the	fraction	of	hours	for	which	call	
activity	was	logged.		This	was	due	entirely	to	the	nature	of	the	attacks	and	the	associated	
investigations,	and	is,	of	course,	a	limitation	of	using	secondary	data.		In	their	study,	Smith	
et	al.	(2008,	p.51)	found	that	plots	last	an	average	of	three	months	from	“the	first	known	
preparatory	activities…to	the	incident	date”	and	so	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	data	
analyzed	here	are	likely	to	cover	the	period	of	activity	during	the	build-up	to	each	attack	
(see	also	Sothern	et	al.,	2008).		
	
INSERT	TABLE	1	ABOUT	HERE	
	
In	their	study,	Song	et	al.	(2010,	p.1019)	found	that	users	tend	“to	place	most	of	
their	calls	in	short	bursts...followed	by	long	periods	with	no	call	activity".		Analysis	of	the	
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timing	of	calls	for	our	data	suggests	that	the	same	was	true	here.		For	example,	Figure	1	(top	
panel)	shows	a	“timecode”	of	all	calls	logged	to	the	phones	used	by	the	Emir	involved	in	Plot	
A	over	the	period	for	which	data	were	available	(For	Plots	B-D,	see	online	Supplementary	
Information	(SI)	Figures	1-3).		Each	vertical	line	indicates	the	time	a	call	was	logged	for	that	
plot.		The	bottom	panel	of	Figure	1	shows	the	observed	distribution	of	waiting	times	(the	
time	elapsed	between	sequential	calls)	between	call	logs,	aggregated	to	hourly	intervals.		It	
also	shows	the	expected	distribution,	computed	assuming	that	the	timing	of	calls	was	
random1.		Inspection	of	the	waiting	time	distributions	indicates	that	the	time	elapsed	
between	calls	was	typically	shorter	(typically	1-2	hours)	for	the	observed	distribution	than	
that	expected,	and	that	far	fewer	calls	occurred	(say)	4-10	hours	apart	than	would	be	
expected,	assuming	that	the	timing	of	calls	was	independent.		Simply	put,	visual	inspection	
of	the	data,	and	a	statistical	analysis	of	the	waiting	time	distribution	between	call	logs,	
suggest	that	the	pattern	is	'bursty'	or	'clumpy'.			
Further	inspection	of	the	data	indicated	that	while	some	of	this	pattern	was	likely	
due	to	the	subjects’	rhythms	of	activity,	it	was	also	due	to	the	fact	that	some	calls	logged	
were	either	missed	or	failed	attempts	(calls	that	lasted	zero	seconds),	which	were	then	
repeated	(often)	a	few	minutes	later	in	an	attempt	to	make	contact.		While	this	issue	has	
not	been	discussed	in	previous	studies	(e.g.	Song	et	al.,	2010),	to	assume	that	calls	are	
independent	might	provide	a	biased	picture	of	the	subject’s	mobility	patterns	insofar	as	
estimates	of	the	time	spent	at	particular	locations	might	be	inflated	by	failed	and	missed	call	
																																																						
1	To	calculate	the	expected	distribution,	we	simulate	a	Bernouli	trial	for	which	the	likelihood	that	a	call	will	be	
made	or	received	within	any	hourly	interval	is	assumed	to	be	constant	(and	equal	to	the	total	number	of	hours	
with	calls	divided	by	the	number	of	hourly	intervals).		Using	a	Monte	Carlo	simulation,	we	generate	999	“trials”	
and	for	each	compute	the	waiting	time	distribution	and	compare	this	to	that	for	the	observed	data.		This	
allows	us	to	compute	the	mean	expected	value,	confidence	intervals	and	the	probability	of	observing	a	given	
value,	assuming	the	null	hypothesis	(that	the	timing	of	calls	is	independent)	is	true.	
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attempts.		As	a	sensitivity	test	to	reduce	the	potential	influence	that	repeated	calls	at	the	
same	location	might	have,	in	what	follows,	we	performed	every	analysis	for	each	data	set	in	
its	entirety	(as	in	Song	et	al.,	2010),	and	for	a	smaller	sample	for	which	each	individual	mast	
was	counted	just	once	in	any	single	hour-period.		The	patterns	for	the	two	sets	of	analyses	
did	not	differ	and	so	the	latter	analyses	are	discussed	no	further.	
	
INSERT	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE	
	
At	this	point,	it	is	important	to	note	that	unlike	GPS	data,	‘cell	siting’	provides	only	an	
approximation	of	the	user’s	actual	location	at	the	time	a	call	was	made	or	received.		While	
the	approach	taken	here	follows	an	established	methodology	(Gonzalez	et	al.,	2008;	Song	et	
al.,	2010)	it	is	necessary	to	outline	its	limitations.		When	a	mobile	phone	is	used	the	call	is	
routed	through	a	cell	tower.		In	previous	research,	and	that	reported	here,	it	is	assumed	
that	this	will	be	the	cell	tower	closest	to	the	user,	since	this	is	the	way	call	routing	is	
intended	to	work.		The	location	of	the	user	at	that	time	is	then	estimated	with	reference	to	
the	coverage	area	(represented	as	a	voronoi	lattice)	of	the	cell	site	mast	to	which	the	call	is	
connected.		However,	masts	have	different	coverage	areas,	ranging	from	tens	to	hundreds	
of	meters	in	cities,	to	several	kilometers	in	rural	areas	(Mobile-phone	Base	Station	
Database,	n.d.).	Additionally,	network	capacity	management	processes	mean	that	whilst	the	
nearest	mast	will	normally	carry	a	call,	this	may	not	always	be	the	case.		Inevitably	then,	
there	will	be	some	error	in	the	estimate	as	to	exactly	where	a	caller	is	located	at	a	particular	
time2	and	this	must	be	considered	when	interpreting	the	findings	of	studies	which	use	this	
																																																						
2	For	a	sample	of	data,	the	size	of	this	error	could	be	estimated	using	data	regarding	the	coverage	area	
associated	with	each	cell	site	mast	to	which	calls	were	connected.		However,	in	the	current	case,	the	cellsite	
data	are	10-15	years	old	and	data	on	the	coverage	of	each	cell	site	was	not	available	for	analysis.	
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type	of	data.		In	the	current	case,	the	individuals	involved	lived	in	urban	areas,	where	the	
(higher)	density	of	base	stations	means	that	the	estimated	locations	are	likely	to	be	more	
accurate	than	they	would	be	for	(say)	rural	areas,	which	reduces	the	potential	error.		
However,	given	the	uncertainty	discussed,	it	is	important	recognize	that	the	data	analyzed	
here	and	in	previous	studies	provide	insight	into	overall	rather	than	exact	patterns	of	
movement.		
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	like	previous	studies	(Gonzalez	et	al.,	2008;	Song	et	
al.	(2010),	data	were	not	generated	using	GPS	data	or	a	systematic	sampling	methodology.		
Instead,	they	were	captured	(only)	when	subjects	happened	to	make	or	receive	calls.		
Consequently,	the	call	records	obtained	do	not	provide	a	complete	picture	of	terrorist	
mobility.		There	are	two	consequences	to	this.		First,	as	shown	in	Table	1,	data	are	not	
available	for	all	intervals	of	the	day,	or	even	all	hourly	intervals.	The	percentage	of	coverage	
was	understandably	higher	during	daylight	(8am-8pm)	than	night-time	(8pm-8am)	hours	
(26%	vs.	13%	of	hours	covered),	but	these	figures	are	quite	low	and	are	less	than	those	
reported	in	Song	et	al.	(2010),	who	found	that	for	a	typical	user,	location	updates	were	
available	for	about	30%	of	the	hourly	Intervals	considered.		Given	the	nature	of	the	current	
study	this	is	perhaps	not	surprising,	but	the	reader	should	bear	this	in	mind.	
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	for	plot	B,	the	amount	of	data	recorded	reduced	
drastically	halfway	through	the	period.	This	was	because	the	subject	involved	generally	(but	
not	exclusively)	used	one	particular	mobile	phone,	for	which	cell	site	information	was	
unavailable	from	this	point	on.	The	mean	number	of	cell	site	‘hits’	in	the	earlier	period	
(when	the	subject	typically	used	a	variety	phones)	was	16	per	day,	but	this	reduced	to	2.5	
during	the	second	half	of	the	period	(when	one	phone	was	used	more	consistently).	In	
addition,	for	plot	D,	there	was	a	one-month	period	for	which	data	were	unavailable.	
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More	generally,	because	the	data	are	not	captured	continuously,	and	because	those	
involved	can	use	a	number	of	phones,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	data	can	be	patchy	
and	fail	to	provide	a	complete	picture	of	the	movement	of	those	involved.	In	two	of	the	four	
cases,	however,	they	capture	the	subjects’	movements	during	their	attacks,	suggesting	that	
with	the	exception	of	plot	B,	it	is	unlikely	that	there	was	a	systematic	bias	in	the	missing	
data.		In	what	follows,	however,	we	encourage	the	reader	to	acknowledge	the	limitations	of	
the	data	and	to	consider	them	to	represent	only	a	proxy	for	true	movement	patterns.			
	
2.2	Safe	houses	and	Home	locations	
In	all	four	plots,	the	Emirs	used	a	safe	house	away	from	their	normal	home	address	to	
conduct	preparatory	activity.	The	location	of	these	addresses	formed	an	important	part	of	
the	prosecution	in	each	case	and	were	used	in	open	court,	as	well	as	being	reported	in	the	
press.	Consequently,	these	addresses	and	each	subject’s	home	address	were	used	in	what	
follows	to	examine	the	Emir’s	movement	around	these	‘anchor’	points.		For	three	of	the	
plots,	only	one	home	location	and	one	safe	house	was	identified.		For	Plot	A,	there	were	two	
safe	houses,	although	these	were	used	consecutively	rather	than	concurrently.		At	any	point	
in	time	then,	for	this	plot,	the	Emir	would	have	used	exactly	one	home	location	and	one	safe	
house	and	account	of	this	is	taken	in	what	follows.	
	
3. ANALYTIC	STRATEGY	AND	RESULTS	
3.1	Predictability	of	movement	
To	see	if	the	Emir’s	appeared	to	have	routine	activity	spaces	(Hypothesis	1),	we	first	
considered	the	number	of	cell	site	locations	they	visited	and	the	frequency	with	which	they	
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did	so	over	the	entire	period	for	which	data	were	available.		As	well	as	summarizing	their	
activity	patterns,	this	provides	an	indication	of	how	predictable	their	patterns	of	movement	
were.		To	do	this,	following	previous	research	on	the	wider	population	(e.g.	Song	et	al.,	
2010),	we	identified	each	unique	cell	site	mast	to	which	each	Emir’s	calls	were	logged,	and	
calculated	the	frequency	with	which	each	cell	site	appeared	in	the	data	for	that	subject.		
Figure	2	shows	an	example	of	the	spatial	distribution	of	the	cell	sites	for	Plot	A	(maps	for	the	
other	plots	are	shown	as	online	SI	Figures	4-6).		The	point	locations	are	scaled	
proportionately	to	indicate	the	frequency	with	which	they	were	visited.		The	lines	
connecting	them	provide	an	idea	of	the	sequence	and	length	of	movement,	and	these	too	
are	proportionately	scaled	to	indicate	how	frequently	the	subject	moved	between	each	pair	
of	nodes.	
	
INSERT	FIGURE	2	ABOUT	HERE	
	
The	maps	for	all	plots,	including	that	shown	in	Figure	2,	suggest	a	routine	activity	space.		
That	is,	some	cell	site	locations	were	clearly	visited	more	than	others,	and	while	activity	
took	place	further	afield,	most	activity	was	clustered	at,	around	or	between	the	safe	
house(s)	and	home	locations.		To	examine	such	patterns	more	systematically,	following	
previous	research	(Gonzalez	et	al.,	2008;	Song	et.	al.,	2010),	for	each	plot	we	computed	the	
cumulative	frequency	with	which	an	Emir’s	phone	connected	with	each	cell	tower.		Figure	3	
shows	the	cumulative	probability	distributions	for	all	four	plots.		For	reference,	it	also	shows	
the	patterns	observed	in	the	Song	et	al.	(2010)	study,	which	examined	patterns	of	activity	
for	the	wider	population.		
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INSERT	FIGURE	3	ABOUT	HERE	
	
The	patterns	shown	in	Figure	3	suggest	that	for	each	Emir,	most	call	activity	occurred	at	or	
near	a	small	number	of	cell	site	locations,	providing	support	for	Hypothesis	1.		Relative	to	
the	sample	of	people	examined	in	the	Song	et	al.	(2010)	study,	it	would	appear	that	the	
Emirs’	activity	was	a	little	more	dispersed	than	that	observed	for	the	wider	public.		
However,	the	concentration	of	activity	was	not	so	different	to	that	reported	in	the	Gonzalez	
et	al.	(2008)	study,	and	it	is	important	to	consider	that	the	sample	size	considered	here	is	
small	and	that	context	(geographical	or	otherwise)	may	matter.		
	
3.2	Range	and	pattern	of	movement	
While	the	above	analysis	suggests	that	the	Emirs	routinely	visited	particular	nodes,	it	does	
not	provide	an	indication	of	their	range	of	movement	in	geographical	terms.		In	this	section,	
we	examine	this	by	considering:	1)	the	distance	between	sequential	cell	site	hits;	and,	2)	the	
distance	between	the	locations	at	which	calls	were	made	or	received	and	the	Emirs’	home	
and	safe	houses.	
Ideally,	we	would	have	isolated	specific	journeys	for	each	Emir	and	computed	the	
distance	travelled	for	each	(for	an	example	of	such	an	analysis	for	criminals,	see	Rossmo	et	
al.,	2012).		However,	this	was	not	possible	since	calls	were	not	made	at	regular	intervals	
(e.g.	every	minute)	and	hence	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	the	locations	(destinations)	at	
which	the	Emirs’	stopped	(visited)	for	a	period	of	time.		Instead,	we	examine	the	distances	
between	sequential	cell	site	hits	(for	which	the	time	between	calls	varied),	which	we	
consider	here	to	provide	insight	into	the	length	of	specific	segments	of	each	Emir’s	spatial	
activity	during	a	given	day.		When	computing	these	distances,	we	use	the	details	of	the	cell	
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tower	to	which	each	call	was	initially	connected	and	calculate	the	distance	between	this	
location	and	that	of	the	location	at	which	the	next	call	was	made	or	received.		
Consequently,	in	the	case	that	a	caller	was	moving	through	an	area	and	their	calls	were	
diverted	from	one	cell	tower	to	another,	our	analysis	would	not	generate	a	series	of	short	
distances	since	only	the	first	location	would	be	included	in	the	analysis.		
Figure	4	shows	the	empirical	cumulative	distribution	function	for	these	distances	for	
each	Emir.	As	noted,	it	is	not	possible	to	isolate	specific	journeys	for	each	Emir,	and	so	each	
distance	is	considered	only	to	provide	an	indication	of	their	range	of	movement	from	one	
point	in	time	to	another.		Figure	4	suggests	that	in	most	cases,	the	distances	between	
sequential	cell	site	hits	are	relatively	short	(e.g.	around	80%	are	less	than	6km).		While	not	
directly	comparable	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	according	to	
findings	from	the	Department	for	Transport	National	travel	survey	(Department	for	
Transport,	2015),	for	the	general	public,	around	65%	of	all	trips	are	7.5km	or	less	-	not	unlike	
those	observed	here.		However,	it	is	also	apparent	that	some	distances	are	substantial,	in	
some	cases	exceeding	200km3.		This	suggests	that	while	the	movement	of	all	Emir’s	was	
typically	constrained,	as	expected	(Hypothesis	3),	there	was	also	clear	evidence	of	variability	
in	their	patterns	of	movement	(explored	in	more	detail	below).			
	
INSERT	FIGURE	4	ABOUT	HERE	
	
Considering	the	Emir’s	range	of	movement	around	their	home	and	safe	houses	(or	
anchor	points),	Figure	5	shows	the	empirical	cumulative	distribution	functions	(ECDF)	for	
																																																						
3	For	the	purposes	of	comparison,	for	the	general	public	(DfT,	2015),	around	2%	of	all	trips	exceed	75km.	
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the	distance	of	each	cell	site	hit	and	these	two	anchor	points.		In	the	case	of	plot	A,	we	
compute	the	distance	from	the	safe	house	they	were	using	at	the	time.		To	enhance	
differentiation	at	shorter	distances,	a	logarithmic	scale	is	used	for	the	x-axis	in	Figure	5.		In	
line	with	Hypothesis	2,	it	is	evident	that	most	cell	site	hits	are	near	to	one	or	both	anchor	
points.	For	example,	across	all	plots,	40%	of	cell	site	hits	are	within	5km	of	the	safe	houses,	
and	over	90%	are	within	20km.		Interestingly,	where	activity	was	more	clustered	around	one	
anchor	point	than	the	other,	this	tended	to	be	around	the	safe	house	rather	than	the	home	
location	(see	also	SI	Figures	4-6).		
	
INSERT	FIGURE	5	ABOUT	HERE	
	
3.3	Variation	over	time	
The	analyses	presented	above	are	for	the	entire	time	period	and	hence	may	conceal	
changes	in	the	patterns	of	movement	for	each	Emir	over	time.		In	this	section,	we	examine	
whether	this	was	the	case.		One	option	would	have	been	to	examine	changes	in	the	mean	
distance	between	the	cell	site	locations	the	Emirs’	phones	were	connected	to	and	their	
intended	attack	locations.		However,	due	to	the	nature	of	the	plots,	the	attack	locations	
were	not	discrete	and	hence	this	approach	would	be	potentially	misleading.			For	this	
reason,	we	conducted	two	alternative	forms	of	analysis.		For	the	first,	for	each	plot	we	
calculated	the	mean	distance	between	cell	site	log	locations	for	the	corresponding	Emir	and	
their	home	and	safe	houses	for	each	week.		For	the	purposes	of	illustration,	Figure	6	shows	
such	a	result	for	plot	A	(Figures	for	the	remaining	plots	are	shown	in	the	online	
supplementary	information).		In	this	case,	the	patterns	are	imperfect	but	suggest	a	positive	
association,	whereby	the	average	distance	traveled	from	the	safe	houses	increased	over	
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time.		For	the	second	analysis,	we	counted	the	number	of	unique	cell	site	hits	recorded	per	
week	to	provide	a	different	picture	of	spatial	behavior.		
	
INSERT	FIGURE	6	ABOUT	HERE	
	
Table	2	shows	simple	Spearman’s	bivariate	correlations	for	the	mean	distance	
between	cell	site	log	locations	and	the	Emir’s	anchor	points	and	the	week	of	activity.			The	
results	are	mixed.		For	two	Emirs	(plots	A	and	C)	their	estimated	range	of	movement	from	at	
least	one	anchor	point	increased	as	the	time	to	the	plot	they	were	involved	in	approached.		
For	the	other	two	(Plots	B	and	D),	the	patterns	were	non-significant	(see	also,	SI	Figures	7-
9).			
Considering	the	number	of	unique	cell	site	hits	per	week,	the	results	are	again	
mixed.		For	three	of	the	Emirs,	the	number	of	unique	locations	they	visited	appeared	to	
increase	nearer	to	the	time	of	the	intended	attacks,	but	this	trend	was	only	statistically	
significant	for	two	of	them.		For	the	Emir	involved	in	Plot	B,	the	pattern	was	reversed,	with	
their	pattern	of	movement	appearing	to	decline	nearer	to	the	time	of	the	attack.		However,	
recall	that	for	this	plot,	the	number	of	observations	reduced	drastically	half	way	through	the	
interval	studied	as	a	result	of	this	Emir	largely	(but	not	exclusively)	using	a	single	mobile	
phone	for	which	location	data	was	unavailable.		In	the	case	of	this	analysis,	this	bias	in	the	
data	would	clearly	affect	the	results	obtained	and	may	entirely	explain	the	negative	
correlation	observed.		Thus,	there	is	some	evidence	to	support	Hypothesis	4,	but	for	the	
(small)	sample	of	terrorists	considered	here	the	precise	patterns	clearly	varied.	
	
INSERT	TABLE	2	HERE	
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4. DISCUSSION	
The	aim	of	the	current	study	was	to	examine	the	spatial	behavior	of	a	sample	of	UK-based	
Islamist	terrorists.		In	particular,	analyses	were	conducted	to	determine	whether	their	
patterns	of	movement	resembled	those	of	the	wider	public	and	everyday	criminals,	or	
whether	the	extreme	nature	of	their	offending	leads	to	very	different	patterns	of	spatial	
behavior.		Previous	research	concerned	with	the	spatial	behavior	of	offenders	and	terrorists	
has	generally	made	use	of	datasets	for	which	the	activity	of	a	large	number	of	actors	is	
available,	but	where	few	movements	are	available	per	offender	(for	an	exception	concerned	
with	urban	crime,	see	Rossmo	et	al.,	2012).		In	contrast,	in	the	current	study	data	were	
available	for	only	four	terrorists	meaning	that	the	analyses	presented	are	essentially	case	
studies.		However,	hundreds	of	observations	were	available	for	each	Emir	over	a	non-trivial	
period	of	time,	providing	a	rich	set	of	data	for	a	very	much	understudied	population.		Also	
unlike	other	studies,	the	data	analysed	were	of	mobile	phone	call	logs.		Relative	to	the	
intelligence	reports	used	in	previous	work	concerned	with	this	population,	this	enabled	us	
to	develop	a	more	precise	picture	of	their	spatial	activity	over	time	and	to	examine	how	this	
evolved.	
In	line	with	research	on	human	movement	and	crime	pattern	theory	(see	above),	
there	was	a	clear	regularity	to	the	spatial	behavior	of	each	Emir,	which	appears	to	be	
constrained	by	geography.		First	and	foremost,	most	of	their	activity	–	estimated	using	data	
on	the	locations	at	which	their	calls	were	made	or	received	-	took	place	at	or	around	a	small	
number	of	locations.	Second,	as	with	the	journey	to	crime	literature	for	urban	crime,	there	
was	a	clear	pattern	of	distance	decay	such	that	most	of	the	time,	the	likelihood	that	an	Emir	
was	to	be	found	at	a	location	was	inversely	proportional	to	the	distance	between	that	
location	and	their	home	or	safe	house	locations.		Third,	just	like	the	trips	of	members	of	the	
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wider	public	(Department	for	Transport,	2015),	and	the	sequential	locations	of	burglaries	
committed	by	offenders	(Johnson,	2014),	the	movements	of	the	Emirs	(from	one	call	log	to	
the	next)	tended	to	involve	short	‘jumps’	rather	than	lengthy	journeys,	suggesting	a	
predictability	to	their	spatial	behavior.	
The	findings	thus	provide	support	for	a	small	but	growing	body	of	literature,	discussed	
above,	 that	 suggests	 that	 the	 activity	 patterns	 of	 terrorists	 may	 not	 be	 unlike	 those	 of	
everyday	criminals.		Such	findings	have	implications	for	the	policing	of	terrorism.		For	example,	
in	 their	 study,	 Rossmo	 and	 Harries	 (2011)	 discuss	 the	 potential	 utility	 of	 geographic	
prioritization	models,	which	might	be	used	to	search	for	terrorist	safe	houses,	other	activity	
nodes,	 or	 future	 potential	 target	 locations.	 	 The	 current	 findings	 certainly	 support	 the	
potential	value	of	such	an	approach	for	the	sample	studied,	illustrating	that	most	locations	at	
which	the	Emir’s	calls	were	logged,	tended	to	be	near	to,	clustered	around,	or	between	two	
of	their	anchor	points	(their	safe	houses	or	home	locations).		A	key	aspect	of	such	models	is	
that	they	may	help	to	filter	the	signal	from	the	noise	when	a	large	amount	of	intelligence	is	
generated	for	a	particular	plot.	To	elaborate,	a	huge	amount	of	terrorist-related	intelligence	
is	produced	daily.	Yet	the	processing	and	exploitation	of	such	data,	which	in	its	raw	format	is	
useless,	 lags	behind	(Lowenthal,	2009).	 	 	Geographic	prioritization	approaches	may	help	in	
this	respect.	
In	addition	to	looking	at	patterns	of	spatial	activity,	we	considered	if	and	how	these	
varied	as	the	time	to	the	planned	attack	drew	nearer.		As	discussed	above,	changes	in	
activity	patterns	were	expected	as	different	patterns	of	movement	and	activity	are	likely	at	
different	stages	of	a	plot.		The	obvious	value	of	identifying	any	“signatures”	in	changes	of	
terrorist	activity	prior	to	a	plot	is	that	they	may	provide	a	means	for	prioritising	suspects,	
and	when	to	do	so	(see	also,	Rossmo	et	al.,	2012).			With	respect	to	this	expectation,	our	
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findings	were	mixed.		We	found	evidence	that	three	of	the	four	Emir’s	exhibited	some	
evidence	of	a	change	in	spatial	behavior,	but	the	precise	nature	of	this	change	differed	
across	subjects.		Two	showed	an	increase	in	the	number	of	cell	site	locations	at	which	their	
activity	was	recorded	over	time,	suggesting	that	they	visited	more	varied	locations	over	
time.			For	one	the	reverse	was	true,	but	it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	in	this	case	
this	was	due	to	the	change	in	the	mobile	phones	this	Emir	used	part	way	through	the	period	
(which	generated	substantially	fewer	cell	site	logs)	for	which	data	were	available	(see	
above),	as	this	would	likely	reduce	the	unique	number	of	cell	site	locations	at	which	calls	
were	logged	per	week,	regardless	of	actual	changes	to	the	spatial	behavior.		For	one	Emir,	
the	distance	between	their	home	location	and	those	at	which	cell	site	logs	were	recorded	
increased	over	time,	while	for	another	the	same	trend	was	observed	with	respect	to	their	
safe	house	location.		Thus,	while	changes	were	observed	for	three	Emirs,	the	pattern	was	by	
no	means	consistent.		Moreover,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	current	findings	relate	to	a	
small	sample	of	Islamic	terrorists,	and	only	to	those	who	operated	in	the	UK.		As	such,	it	will	
be	for	future	research	to	examine	whether	such	patterns	are	observed	more	generally	and	if	
so,	which	patterns	are	most	consistent.		Moreover,	it	is	important	to	consider	that	there	will	
be	other	reasons	that	people	might	change	their	spatial	behaviour	over	time	(e.g.	changing	
job)	and	hence	adequate	caution	would	need	to	be	applied	before	basing	operational	
decisions	on	such	patterns.		What	represents	normal	variation	in	spatial	variation	is	also	not	
well	understood	and	hence	future	research	might	also	seek	to	examine	this	in	the	general	
population.	
The	study	is,	of	course,	subject	to	a	number	of	other	limitations.		The	most	obvious	is	
that	the	data	analyzed	are	incomplete.		First,	as	noted	above,	the	movement	of	the	Emirs	
was	captured	using	cell	site	logs,	which	are	only	registered	when	a	call	is	made	or	received.		
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Data	captured	using	GPS	telemetry	would	provide	more	complete	coverage,	but	these	data	
were	not	available	at	the	time	of	the	attacks	studied.		Moreover,	such	data	can	only	be	
captured	on	GPS	enabled	phones	(which	may	be	avoided	by	those	of	interest).		Second,	the	
locations	of	the	safe	houses	examined	here	were	based	on	police	intelligence	which	may	
have	been	incomplete.		Consequently,	the	possibility	exists	that	the	Emir’s	used	additional	
safe	houses,	but	that	this	was	unknown	to	the	police.	
In	 concluding,	we	 note	 that	while	 terrorists	may	 think	 globally,	 empirical	 research	
conducted	to	date	suggests	that	they	act	locally.		Preparations	have	to	occur	somewhere	and	
the	principle	of	 least	effort	 (Zipf,	1950)	suggests	that	 like	everyone	else,	terrorists	will	not	
want	to	invest	unnecessary	time	and	resources	travelling	to	and	from	locations	of	activity.		As	
such,	embedding	their	activity	in	familiar	environments	makes	sense.		The	current	research	
provides	novel	insight	into	the	spatial	behavior	of	a	small	sample	of	actors	involved	in	extreme	
events	and	we	hope	that	it	will	inspire	further	work.	
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Table	1	Period	of	coverage	for	each	plot	from	the	first	hour	of	cell	site	activity	to	the	last,	the	number	of	cell	site	‘hits’	and	the	number	of	
unique	cell	sites	at	which	call	activity	was	logged		
	
	
	
Full	days	of	coverage	
	
Hours	(hrs)	of	coverage*	
	
%hrs	with	cell	
site	activity	
Number	of	cell	
site	‘hits’	
Unique	cell	
sites	visited	
Plot	A	 77	
	
1,838	
	
15	 548	 90	
Plot	B	 131	
	
3,127	
	
13	 1,073	 61	
Plot	C	 161	 3,842	
	
11	 947	 131	
Plot	D	 201	
	
4,808	
	
28	 3,789	 169	
*NOTE:	For	hours	of	coverage,	this	is	calculated	from	the	first	hour	of	cell	site	activity	to	the	last	and	so	it	is	not	simply	the	number	of	days	of	
coverage	multiplied	by	24.
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Table	2	Simple	Spearman’s	rank	correlations	between	the	mean	weekly	distance	travelled	
between	cell	site	log	locations	and	safe	houses	and	the	week	of	the	plot,	and	Pearson’s	
correlations	between	the	number	of	cell	site	hits	and	the	week	of	the	plot		
	
	 Distance	from	Home	
Location	
Distance	from	Safe	
house	
Variability	in	cell	site	
hits	
Plot	A	 0.05	
	
0.76***	 0.42	
Plot	B	 0.24	 0.27	 -0.54***	
Plot	C	 0.59**	 0.21	 0.48***	
Plot	D	 -0.14	 -0.01	 0.75***	
***	p<0.01	 **p<0.05	 *p<0.10	(two-tailed)	
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Figure	1	The	timing	of	calls	logged	by	the	Emir	for	Plot	A	(Top	Panel)	and	the	observed	and	
expected	(vertical	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals	computed	using	a	Monte	Carlo	
simulation)	waiting	time	distribution	between	call	logs	(Bottom	Panel)	
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Figure	2	Spatial	patterns	of	the	cell	site	nodes	visited	during	Plot	A	(Top	panel:	complete	
range	of	movement;	Bottom	panel:	nodes	visited	most	frequently)	
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Figure	3	Fraction	of	call	logs	recorded	at	the	most	visited	locations	
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Figure	4	Distance	travelled	between	sequential	cell	site	hits	
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Figure	5	Empirical	Cumulative	Distribution	Functions	of	the	distance	(in	km)	of	cell	site	hits	
from	(home	and	safe	house)	anchor	points	(Plots	A	(top	left)-D	(bottom	right)).		
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Figure	6	Mean	weekly	distances	(in	km)	of	cell	site	log	locations	from	safe	houses	for	Plot	A	
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ONLINE	SUPPLIMENTARY	INFORMATION	(SI)	
SI	Figure	1	Timing	of	calls	logged	by	the	Emir	involved	in	plot	B	(Top	Panel)	and	the	observed	
and	expected	(vertical	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals	computed	using	a	Monte	Carlo	
simulation)	waiting	time	distribution	between	call	logs	(Bottom	Panel)	
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SI	Figure	2	Timing	of	calls	logged	by	the	Emir	involved	in	plot	C	(Top	Panel)	and	the	observed	
and	expected	(vertical	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals	computed	using	a	Monte	Carlo	
simulation)	waiting	time	distribution	between	call	logs	(Bottom	Panel)	
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SI	Figure	3	Timing	of	calls	logged	by	the	Emir	involved	in	plot	D	(Top	Panel)	and	the	
observed	and	expected	(vertical	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals	computed	using	a	Monte	
Carlo	simulation)	waiting	time	distribution	between	call	logs	(Bottom	Panel)	
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SI	Figure	4:	Spatial	patterns	of	the	cell	site	nodes	visited	during	Plot	B	(Top	panel:	complete	
range	of	movement;	Bottom	panel:	nodes	visited	most	frequently)	
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SI	Figure	5:	Spatial	patterns	of	the	cell	site	nodes	visited	during	Plot	C	(Top	panel:	complete	
range	of	movement;	Bottom	panel:	nodes	visited	most	frequently)	
	
	
	
	 	
30km
Home
Safe House
2km
Home
Safe House
	 44	
SI	Figure	6:	Spatial	patterns	of	the	cell	site	nodes	visited	during	Plot	D	(Top	panel:	complete	
range	of	movement;	Bottom	panel:	nodes	visited	most	frequently)	
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SI	Figure	7:	Mean	weekly	distances	(in	km)	of	cell	site	log	locations	from	safe	houses	for	Plot	
B	
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SI	Figure	8:	Mean	weekly	distances	(in	km)	of	cell	site	log	locations	from	safe	houses	for	Plot	
C	
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SI	Figure	9:	Mean	weekly	distances	(in	km)	of	cell	site	log	locations	from	safe	houses	for	Plot	
D	
	
NOTE:	for	this	plot,	data	were	unavailable	for	a	one-month	interval	(weeks	19-22	of	the	30-
week	interval).		In	the	figures	shown,	we	exclude	this	period	as	the	aim	of	the	analysis	was	
simply	to	examine	whether	the	Emir’s	spatial	behavior	changed	over	time.	
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